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Abstract 
This paper deals with a stochastic dynamic optimization problem in the context of illegal company 
financing. Our analysis of the usury phenomenon is conducted by searching for the best interest rate 
which an illegal fina  
whilst still securing the maximum wealth for In this case, the company itself 
can be taken over and used by the financier for illegal activities. Because of the highly complex 
nature of the problem, the analysis will be performed via simulation studies. 
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 2 
Introduction 
Several European countries base their anti-usury laws on the definition of a critical interest rate 
applied to the borrower by the lender, regardless of the nature of the lender.  
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the limits of this approach, emphasizing the importance of 
the role played by organized crime in usury credit. The problem is more relevant in this period of 
financial crisis, since many firms in difficulty find themselves rationed by the legitimate sector and 
may resort to looking for finance from the usury market.  
It is well known that the subject who loans money at a usurious interest rate generally comes from 
organized crime and uses the usury credit as a money laundering technique. 
A criminal organization which has committed a crime gains an aggregate illegal monetary return 
from this activity. If the criminal organization uses these illegal funds directly, it increases the 
probability of its being detected and charged with the crime, therefore it seeks to launder dirty 
money. All illegal activities which circumvent government laws and regulations and the income 
derived from them, potentially all the revenues produced by the underground economy, need to be 
laundered (Schneider 2005). 
One of the most common money laundering techniques used by criminal organizations is usury 
credit. They utilize these loans to pursue their final goal, namely to gain possession of the collateral 
offered by the borrower, which has an illegal value peculiar to them.  
As Masciandaro (2001) and Europol (2008) have pointed out, organized crime groups are 
showcasing significant use of legitimate business structures to launder criminal proceeds and 
establish themselves in legal business.  
In this paper, we make a two-fold contribution to the economic literature on the topic. On the one 
hand, we analyze the relationship between organized crime, money laundering1 and usury credit, 
focusing on the optimal interest rate chosen by the illegal financier in order to achieve his aim.  On 
the other hand, we suggest a methodology that is, at this time, a crucial innovation. 
We propose a stochastic dynamic optimization problem, with particular reference to the field of 
optimal control theory. 
Several monographs give a complete survey of mathematical control theory. For the deterministic 
case, we remind the reader to Bardi and Capuzzo Dolcetta (1997). Stochastic control theory is 
described in Borkar (1989), Fleming and Soner (1993), Krylov (1980), Yong and Zhou (1999). 
The key point of optimal control theory is represented by an optimization problem, where the 
constraints are associated to the properties of some functions (control variables), which are elements 
                                                 
For a survey of the literature see  Walker and Unger 2009, Unger 2009, Argentiero et al 2008, Barone and 
Masciandaro 2008, Schneider 2008. See also Bagella et al. 2009. Micro dynamic models are proposed in Argentiero et 
al. 2008, Bagella et al. 2009. A static model of money laundering by usury is showed in Barone 2004. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
 3 
of a certain functional space (the admissible region). Dependence on time, besides the control 
variables, is also represented by the introduction of a state variable, which describes the evolution 
of the system. Thus, the objective function depends on the state variable and controls, and the 
optimum with respect to the controls of this objective functional is called the value function. 
The stochastic framework is related to the analysis of cases with an admissible region given by 
stochastic process spaces. 
In our context, the objective function, which the usurer needs to maximize, is made up of two terms: 
the probability of the firm defaulting and the probability of the guarantee related to the borrower 
being positive when the funded company goes bankrupt. The admissible region contains the suitable 
loan interest rates applied for the restitution of the debt, and the state equation describes the 
evolution of the wealth of the funded company. 
The optimal solution will be obtained by performing  a simulation study using the Monte Carlo 
method in order to determine the optimal interest rate required by a criminal creditor to achieve 
her/his goals. 
We stress that the illegal financier is aiming for the borrower to default, since only in this case 
could the usurer take possession of the collateral, that is, in our analysis, the legitimate firm in need 
of funds. 
Collateral is a fundamental tool in money laundering and, as such, it is of great intrinsic value to the 
illegal financier. 
Money-laundering enables the criminal organization to disguise the illegal origins of its wealth, 
throw off suspicions of law enforcement and erase any incriminating traces of illegal activity. 
(UNODOC Annual Report 2010).  
The use of properly incorporated legal entities, which have a proven financial and commercial track 
record, is usually one of the most common methods of disguising the true ownership and the origin 
of the funds used. Companies facing mounting debts are frequently employed to merge illegal 
capital with the legal capital of previously properly incorporated firms.  The investor could request 
the amendment of the legal documents to empower him/her to manage the finances of the company, 
or he/she may affect the balance sheet of the company in order to merge the illegal money with the 
money used for the regular course of business. (FATF  GAFI 2007) 
This criminal strategy increases in those countries where justice is weak and lawlessness and 
instability prevail.  When countries lack strong judicial institutions  such as forceful criminal 
legislation, reliable law enforcement, a fair judiciary and a humane prison system  criminals find 
opportunities to profit. (UNODOC Annual Report 2010)  
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In the light of our previous remarks, we believe that the choice of setting an interest rate ceiling on 
the loan contract may be necessary, but is not enough to counteract the illegal practices. When the 
Authorities design the optimal policy, they should increase their efforts in monitoring loan activity. 
The main problem should be the fight against money-laundering because, in general, it is the origin 
of any further illegal activity concerning usury credit. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we analyze the definition of usury in several 
European countries and in the United States; in section 2, the evolution equation of company wealth 
is described, while in Section 3, we illustrate the optimization problem. Section 4 is devoted to 
constructing the optimal strategies via a Monte Carlo simulation and section 5 concludes.  
 
1 Usury laws in Europe and the United States 
Several countries base their anti-usury laws on the explicit definition of an objective illegal interest 
rate threshold. Criminal laws on usury in some other countries are based on the courts' perception of 
the entity of the restitution rate, when it is compared to the original loan. Generally, one can say that 
usury regulation focuses on the assumption that usury can be viewed as an onerous credit contract. 
An overview of the definition of usury in the principal European countries and in the US now 
follows, mainly referencing to Masciandaro, (2001). 
In Austria an objective usury threshold does not exist, and the courts evaluate whether the interest 
rate applied is clearly disproportionate to the value of the service. 
In Belgium the threshold is determined by the King at least every six months, and it depends on the 
type, amount and duration of the credit. 
The law in France identifies different thresholds for corresponding categories of credits as a 
proportion of the average rates applied by banks to the same types of transactions. The proportion is 
actually fixed at one-third. 
In Germany, as in Austria, a subjective concept of disproportion is also applied to punish illegal 
financing. However, some objective parameters related to the monthly report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank are commonly used to clarify the concept of disproportion. 
The legislation in Ireland moved in 1995 from an objective threshold of 39% to a subjective 
evaluation by the courts, based on the rates applied in the market and on the characteristics of the 
contract and of the borrower. 
The definition of the usury rate in Italy is quite similar to the one applied in France. Some objective 
thresholds are fixed at one and half times the average rate of the quarterly interest rates for 
corresponding categories of credit. 
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 5 
A subjective mechanism for determining the usury rate is applied in Luxembourg, based on the 
market interest rates and on the degree of difficulty and inexperience of the borrower. 
The Netherlands have an administrative regulation providing a rule for the determination of the 
usury rate based on the duration and the amount of the credit. 
In Portugal an objective threshold is fixed as the annual legal interest rate plus 3-5%, which 
becomes 7-9% in the case of late payment. The exact percentage of increase chosen depends on the 
existence of real collateral. 
The courts in Spain define the subjective threshold case by case, after analyzing the characteristics 
of the borrower and the market interest rates. 
In Switzerland, the definition of usury rates is a matter for each Canton. However, it is commonly 
accepted that usury takes place when the annual restitution rate exceeds the legal annual interest 
rate by 18%. 
In the UK, an enormous restitution rate is viewed as a distortion of the credit contract, and the 
courts can impose corrective action based on a subjective evaluation. 
In the US, the situation is quite complicated, since each State of the Union has specific legislation to 
pin down the illegal interest rate. This is exemplified by the few examples which follow. Some 
states are more tolerant than others: in Colorado the usury rate is 45%, while in Illinois it is 9%. In 
New Mexico, the usury rate is fixed by the courts, yet in Wisconsin it depends on the characteristics 
of the credit. 
 
2 The evolution equation 
We assume that a criminal subject needs funds for an investment project. When the contract 
expires, the borrower should repay the principal and the interest. If the borrower defaults, then s/he 
has to transfer ownership of the collateral to the lender. At the beginning of the contract, the initial 
value of the capital borrowed plus interest is lower than the actual value of the good offered as 
collateral, therefore the borrower prefers to repay the debt, if s/he is able to do so.   
To obtain funds, it is possible to apply to a legal or illegal creditor. If the contract is drawn up with 
a legal lender, the borrower has the opportunity to obtain a loan with a lower interest rate than the 
illegal rate. Both types of contract stipulate transfer of ownership of the collateral if the borrower is 
not able to repay the loan. This guarantee has a different value for the legal creditor, in particular a 
bank, and for the usurer; the legal costs of liquidating the good for a bank are higher than for the 
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usurer.2 The latter assigns a higher illegal value to the good as it can be used for money laundering 
purposes.  
If the borrower is successful, s/he repays the capital plus the interests. In the following, we assume 
that at t0, i.e. the starting period, the borrower applies to a usurer because s/he has been rationed by 
the legal market or for a personal choice of convenience (Masciandaro, 2001).  
The borrower is obliged to pledge the company in need of finance to the usurer as collateral.  
At time t the wealth of the company amounts to X , and it is described by a controlled stochastic 
differential equation, as we shall see. 
We also introduce a probability space with filtration ,P,FF, 0tt  where the filtration  is 
assumed to be cadlag and is constructed as  
,0t   N,ts0  ,sFt X   
with 
.0: APFAN   
 
The value of the firm could change over time and its wealth could take on the lowest value of  0 or  
the maximum amount equal to K . When the reaches level K, the company is able 
to repay its debt. 
The state equation describes the stochastic evolution of the dynamic associated to the wealth of the 
firm. It is given by the following controlled stochastic differential equation with initial data.  
 
00
(
XX
XXX ,tdWtdtt)ttd
 (1) 
where 
 R,  are related, respectively, to the 
wealth.  
)  is an -adapted stochastic process, and it represents the loan interest rate applied by the 
financier to the funded firm. 
KX ,00  is the initial wealth of the firm. Formally, it should be an integrable random 
variable in [0 K] with law 0, that is measurable with respect to 0. Since it is reasonable that the 
                                                 
2 Bester (1994) shows that the optimal contract for a bank is a loan without guarantee. With this contract, the borrower 
should pay a higher interest rate on the loan, but if s/he default ose the collateral. For a conservative 
analysis in the following we will assume a banking contract with collateral.     
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 7 
initial situation of the funded company is known, we can assume that KX ,x 00 , x non 
random.  
 W( ) is a standard 1-dimensional Brownian motion which is independent of 0. It drives the 
 
Remark 1 The bound values 0 and K are absorbing barriers for the , which 
evolves under the pressure of debt repayment.  
 When the wealth of the firm reaches the value 0, the
wealth reaches the value K, then the company is able to extinguish the loan. 
Remark 2 There exists a unique solution for the controlled equation (1) (we remind the reader, for 
example, to ksendal (1995)). 
By Remark 2, and fixed K,x 0  and R , we denote the unique solution of (1) as .xX  
 
Let us denote with he set of the stopping times in [0;+ ), i.e. 
 
0   ,F,0::T tt t  (2) 
and let us define the exit time  (0;K) of the dynamic from (0;K) as  
,,00inf:,0 KtXt xK  (3) 
Since t is cadlag, then (0,K)  
 
3 The optimization problem  
Usury credit appears as a short term loan of a low aggregate amount. The short-term nature of the 
due date makes it unlikely that the borrower will be in a position to pay back the loan plus the 
interest. Sometimes, at the end of the contract, the borrower has the opportunity of renegotiation if 
s/he is insolvent (Caperna and Lotti, 1995; Battaglini and Masciandaro, 2000). The more the debtor 
renegotiates, the higher the amount due becomes until the debtor is unable to fulfill his obligations. 
behavior could be similar to that of a bank, in order to 
set a trap for the borrower. As Unger (2007) pointed out, the rate at which the loan is released might 
not necessarily be higher than the legal rate and might even be lower, simply because often, behind 
usury credit - an illegal activity by its very nature - there is a further hidden illegal activity, namely 
financial money laundering3. At the renegotiation stage, no further traps are needed: the real nature 
of the illegal financier comes out, and the loan interest rates increase.  
                                                 
3 Recently, some economists have proposed estimation of money laundering activity and some others have analyzed the 
usury markets. More specifically, Argentiero et al. (2008), Schneider (2008), Barone and Masciandaro  (2008), Unger 
(2007), Walker (1999) using different methodologies provided measurement of the volume of money laundering. The 
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In our model, the due date is the definitive deadline for debt repayment, and no renegotiation 
opportunities are allowed. In doing this, we aim at focusing on the final target of the illegal 
financier, without stressing the strategies implemented to entice people into financial distress. 
A key role in the usury model is played by the guarantee g which is evaluated by the usurer 
differently from a bank, in particular when the borrower is an entrepreneur.4  Banks base the 
creditworthiness of a firm needing finance on the real guarantee instead of its projected evaluation. 
The aim of the banks is to raise the loans and they are not interested in involving themselves in any 
market where the firm could produce wealth. The aim of the usurer, on the other hand, is to take 
for laundering illegal capital. The value of the 
guarantee is therefore greater for a usurer than for a bank.  
The u  strategy is, therefore, to bring about the borrower  default in order to take possession 
of the collateral. 
The guarantee is related to the wealth of the firm and takes into account the eventual income 
obtained by the financier . Therefore, it seems obvious to 
assume the guarantee to be nonnegative. We define  
,A,,: 000 Kg  (4) 
a general function, with  
.0   ,  such  that  ,,0:: 21 tFtA t  (5) 
Let us define an endogenous time threshold T* such that g satisfies the following boundary     
condition:  
*
*
0 T if  
T if  0
0
0,
0,
, ,,g  (6) 
where  is the positive value obtained by the illegal subject when the firm goes to bankruptcy. T* is 
assumed to be a short maturation time for the guarantee g, and we will explain its form in the Monte 
Carlo simulation results section. The threshold T* formalizes that the failure of the firm is not 
profitable for the lender at the beginning of the contract. The usurer needs to wait till the moment 
when such prof  
The illegal financier aims to maximize the probability of company default and, simultaneously, the 
probability of the guarantee being positive.  
Therefore, the value function is: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
result of the more conservative estimation showed that the value of money laundering activity in 2004 was equal to 
US1.2trn. 
4 For an analysis of the differences between legal and illegal credit see also Masciandaro (2001), Crosato-Dalla 
Pellegrina (2008) and Dalla Pellegrina (2008).   
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 9 
,00,,0max: ,0,0,0,0 KKKKA XXgPXPxV  (7) 
 
In Table 1, we summarize the main variables used in the previous theoretical analysis and their 
significance in order to facilitate the reading of the following section. 
 
Table 1.  The main theoretical variables and their significance. 
Variable Significance 
(t) Loan interest rate at time t: it is the control variable of the optimization problem 
1 Lower bound of the usury interest rate  
2 Upper bound of the usury interest rate  
X(0) Initial wealth of the firm 
X(t) Value of the firm at time t, X(t) [0,K]. It is the state variable 
G Guarantee related to the wealth of the firm 
T Set of the stopping times 
(0,K) Exit time of the dynamic from (0,K) 
T* Maturation time for guarantee 
 
 
4 Monte Carlo simulation results 
Our goal is to derive the interest rate  which can maximize the objective function V(x) defined in 
(7). Via a Monte Carlo simulation, we build 1000 different trajectories X of 
equation (1); to this end, , accordingly with the empirical literature, is assumed to vary in an 
appropriate band while the other   
 although the upper bound of the usury interest rate is generally infinity, empirical evidence 
shows that 2 = 500% with only 9% of the event surpassing such a high threshold.5 As a result, 
the lower bound is assumed to be 1 = 0 while, in line with the aims of the illegal financier (to 
construct a trap for the company, to reinvest illegal money),  the upper bound is fixed to 2 = 
5; 
  = (1 +  ) = 1.001, where  is the revaluation rate of the company;  
  = 0.01; 
                                                 
5 Centro Studi e Ricerche sulla Legalita' e Criminalita' Economica, L'usura tra vecchi confini e nuovi mercati, Roma - 2002. 
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 10 
 in relation to the starting value X0 we consider three different starting points, i.e. X0=100, X0 = 
500 and X0 = 1000 respectively to represent small, medium and large enterprises;  
 the restitution threshold is related to the initial amount of the loan, namely D. We assume that 
D is given by 20% of the value X(0). Hence we have D = 20, D = 100 and D = 200 for small, 
medium and large companies, respectively; 
 a prudential restitution threshold K can be given as the sum of the initial wealth of the firm 
and more than double the debt amount D. So we assume K = 150, K = 750 and K = 1500 for 
small, medium and large companies, respectively. 
The simulation procedure for the three cases of small, medium and large companies is implemented 
as follows: 
 the Brownian Motion is discretized as ,ttdW  
extracted by a centered normal distribution and t = 1; 
 we consider a discretization of the range [0, 5] of the interest rate   with a step equal to 0.01; 
we denote each value of  as i  ( i = 1,..., 50.000); 
 we identify time-points as days and we consider 1000 points to construct each trajectory in 
order to analyze the evolution of the approximately three years;  
 fixed i, 1000 trajectories ijX ( j = 1,..., 1000) are built 
6; 
 for each ijX we derive the time ij  in which, for the first time, the trajectory of ijX  hits the 
barrier {0,K}. 
Let be in  the number of the ij  such that ijX ( (0,K)) = 0; we calculate for each value of i 
probability considered in equation (7) as follows 
i
i
i hnXP Kj 1000
0,0  (8) 
 
For each value of i the average  of the in  values ij for which ijX  ( (0,K)) = 0 is also derived.  
To determine the second component of the value function (7), we argue that: 
 
0,00100 ,0,0,0 KXgPXgP KKK  (9) 
Therefore, 00 K0,K0, XgP  can be written as iK , where  
                                                 
6 When the 1000 trajectories i
jX , each made up of 1000 points, are traced, the value i, increases by 0.01 and then in 
relation to this new value of the interest rate we determine another 1000 trajectories of 1000 points, and so on.  
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i
i
i
n
k j
*T#
 (10) 
 
The value of T* can be obtained starting from the previous results; in particular, considering all the 
values assumed by , we calculate the semi-average of all the ij for which ijX ( (0,K)) = 0. Then, 
for each value of i we calculate the number of the ij that are smaller or equal to T
* and we divide 
this number by ijn . 
In order to solve our optimization problem, we then need to determine the (optimal)  
which satisfies the maximization of the sum ii kh 1 . 
As a result we obtain that 
1. The optimizing * of the loan interest rate, which is needed for the purposes of the 
illegal financier (i.e. to maximize the default probability of the company and, 
simultaneously, the probability that the guarantee related to the firm is positive when the 
company is bankrupt) is very high and close to the upper bound of the interest rate variation 
range. In particular, we obtain that * is equal to 4.7909, 4.8990 and 4.9103 respectively for 
the small, the medium and large enterprises. We can also argue that the level of the interest 
rate * increases with respect to the size of the firm. Our explanation is that the value 
function in (7) is the maximum of the sum of two terms: the probability of default and the 
probability of a positive guarantee when the company fails. When the loan interest rate 
increases, then company default should become more probable and the firm  life-time 
before default shorter. Therefore, the financial distress period should be long enough to 
allow the guarantee to become positive, but not long enough to wait for exploitation of the 
. Hence, we reasonably have that the optimizing interest rate is close to 
the upper bound of the variation range; 
2. after performing a correlation analysis7 of the results obtained for 0,0 KXP , , 
00 ,0,0 KK XgP  we have that  
                                                 
7 It is possible to analyze in detail such results for each firm size in Table A1 of the Appendix. Since the correlation 
values are small, as standard econometric theory suggests when referring to a considerable amount of information as in 
this case,  we also performed a simple linear regression of P(X  (  (0,K) )0),  and P(g  (  (0,K) )>0 |X  ( (0,K) )=0) with 
respect to , in order to confirm the evidence in the correlation  direction; the results obtained are classified by firm 
size and reported in Table A2 of the Appendix.  
Once more, having a considerable amount of data and because the aim of these regressions is to receive confirmation 
about the sign (and subsequently about the causality direction) of the regression parameters, it is possible to understand 
why there is a  very low R2 associated to any simple linear regression. In any case,  the t-tests allow us to be confident 
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 the probability 0,0 KXP  increases with respect to the interest rate . This result is to 
be expected has a negative effect on the evolution of the  
 the average  of the values of the ij   for which 0,0 KX  decreases with respect to 
. The result is also as expected in this case, since the growth in the loan interest rate has 
accelerated the failure of the company; 
 the probability 00 ,0,0 KK XgP  increases with respect to 
interested in the real value of the firm but rather in his/her own personal use of the guarantee. 
The usurer could request the transfer of ownership of the company from the borrower to 
him/herself in order to merge the illegal money with the money used in the course of legal 
business, in other words laundering dirty money.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to pinpoint the level of interest rate which allows illegal financiers to 
maximize their target function. We propose a new model specifically 
objective, as the usurer aims to maximize the probability of leading the company into bankruptcy 
and, simultaneously, of obtaining the maximum wealth level of the firm . 
Due to the particular complexity of the function of the illegal objective, we solve the optimization 
problem by performing a Monte Carlo simulation procedure. Globally, the results obtained show 
that (i) the level of interest rate needed for the purposes of the illegal financier is very high and 
close to the upper bound of the interest rate variation range; (ii) the optimizing loan interest rate 
increases default probability of the company increases with 
respect to the interest rate; (iii) the average of the time values for which the borrower is in default 
decreases as the interest rate increases; (iv) the probability that the guarantee is positive when the 
borrower is in default increases with respect to the loan interest rate. 
Judicial experience may suggest the presence of a critical date t , when the interest rate payable for 
the restitution of the loan is renegotiated. Indeed, a typical repayment plan consists in a number of 
small installments at the beginning and a single huge installment, to be repaid by the company 
owner to the usurer at a future date t , which appears, to the borrower, to be a long time away. The 
borrower is often unable to pay such a huge amount and, in this worst-case scenario, the usurer 
imposes different conditions and the debt is renegotiated. The formalization of a model describing 
this framework is already on our research agenda. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of a probability of 95% in the value, and so in the sign, of any regressor coefficient and, as a consequence, it is 
possible to confirm the results reported in  previous Table A1 regarding  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Correlations between the quantities obtained via the Monte Carlo Simulation.
 X(0)=100 X(0)=500 X(0)=1000 
,0,0 KXP  0.003355 0.00382 0.00160 
,  -0.00746 -0.00246 -0.00208 
,00 ,0,0 KK XgP  0.00656 0.00312 0.00390 
 
Table A2. Results of the Regressions between the quantities obtained via the Monte Carlo 
Simulation. Dependent variable: interest rate level ( ). 
Independent variable X(0)=100 X(0)=500 X(0)=1000 
0,0 KXP  1.68 
(0.776) 
1.90 
(0.696) 
0.80 
(0.380) 
 -0.0037 
(0.000014) 
-0.0012 
(0.00015) 
-0010 
(0.00005) 
00 ,0,0 KK XgP  3.287 (1.673) 
1.556 
(0.192) 
1.94 
(0.946) 
 Each parameter is significative at 5% referring  to a bilateral test 
 Standard error in brackets 
 Number of observations = 50000. 
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